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
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LEBANON: HEAVY FIGHTING BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS CONTINUED IN THE NORTHERN PORT CITY OF TRIPOLI YESTERDAY. AT LEAST 25 PERSONS HAVE DIED IN THE LATEST ROUND OF HOSTILITIES, AND PARTS OF THE CITY ARE WITHOUT WATER OR ELECTRICITY. 4

MILITIAMEN FROM TRIPOLI, A PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM CITY, REPORTEDLY HAVE TAKEN UP POSITIONS IN THE HILLS OVERLOOKING THE NEARBY CHRISTIAN VILLAGE OF ZACHARTA. THEY HAVE BEEN SHELLING THE VILLAGE WITH MORTARS AND ROCKET-LAUNCHED GRENADES. THE ATTACKERS ARE SEEKING REVENGE FOR THE SLAYING OF 12 MUSLIMS BY CHRISTIAN MILITIAMEN ON SUNDAY ON THE TRIPOLI-BEIRUT HIGHWAY. 4

MOST FEDAYEEN LEADERS REALIZE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER RASHID KARAMI IS AS SYMPATHETIC TO THE PALESTINIANS AS ANY THAT IS LIKELY TO EMERGE OUT OF LEBANON'S POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ACTIONS THAT MIGHT FORCE HIS RESIGNATION. 4

LESS RADICAL FEDAYEEN LEADERS—INCLUDING PLO AND FATAH CHIEF YASIR ARAFAT—ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE, HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF THEIR FAILURE TO WIN ANY CONCESSIONS FOR THE

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PALESTINIANS AS PART OF THE MOST RECENT EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. THEY WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT KEEPING THEIR FOLLOWERS ON THE SIDELINES IF THE FIGHTING CONTINUES.¶

KARAMI, A MUSLIM, APPARENTLY IS AT ODDS WITH INTERIOR MINISTER CAMILLE SHAMUN, A CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN, OVER HOW TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENT TROUBLE. SHAMUN, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HAS THREATENED TO RESIGN UNLESS THE LEBANESE ARMY IS CALLED IN TO STOP THE FIGHTING. KARAMI OPPOSES SUCH A STRATEGY, ON GROUNDS THAT USE OF THE PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN-OFFICERED ARMY WOULD ANTAGONIZE HIS MUSLIM AND LEFTIST SUPPORTERS AND LEAD TO MORE SERIOUS HOSTILITIES.¶

THE ARMY HAS NOT BEEN CALLED ON TO PUT DOWN CIVIL UNREST IN LEBANON SINCE THE SPRING OF 1973. AT THAT TIME, THE ARMY'S FIGHT WITH THE FEDAYEEN BROUGHT SYRIA TO THE VERGE OF MOVING TROOPS INTO LEBANON. THE GOVERNMENT USED ONLY INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES DURING THE FIGHTING IN APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE OF THIS YEAR.¶

A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE CABINET HAD ADOPTED SEVERAL DECISIONS THAT MAY LEAD TO "PACIFICATION OF THE SITUATION.¶" HE OFFERED NO SPECIFICS, AND HE APPEARED PRIMARILY TO

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BE TRYING TO COVER THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN KARAMI AND SHAMUN. 4

THE CABINET WILL MEET AGAIN TODAY. IF IT AGAIN FAILS TO COME  
UP WITH EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES, THE FIGHTING IS LIKELY TO SPREAD  
TO OTHER LEBANESE CITIES AND MAY LEAD TO THE COLLAPSE OF KARAMI'S  
TWO-MONTH-OLD "SALVATION CABINET." 25X1

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//ECUADOR: THE GOVERNMENT IN ECUADOR IS MAKING POLICY AND  
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PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE WAKE OF THE COUP ATTEMPT LAST WEEK.//4

//THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH STILL HAS TO ARREST THE DECLINE IN  
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ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS, APPEARS PREPARED TO TEMPER THE EXTREME  
NATIONALISM THAT HAS ANTAGONIZED FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES.

BOTH MONCAYO AND NATURAL RESOURCES MINISTER LUIS  
SALAZAR HAVE BEEN EASED OUT, AND MANY OTHER CABINET AND HIGH-LEVEL  
MILITARY POSTS HAVE BEEN SHUFFLED. A KEY TROOP COMMANDER, GENERAL

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RUBEN DARIO AYALA, HAS BEEN RELIEVED OF HIS COMMAND AND BROUGHT  
INTO THE GOVERNMENT, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.//4

//PRESIDENT RODRIGUEZ IS WEATHERING THE AFTERMATH OF THE COUP  
ATTEMPT WELL, BUT HE HAS CLEARLY DECIDED THAT SOME CHANGE IN POLICY  
IS NECESSARY.

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CHINA-VIETNAM: PEKING'S TREATMENT OF HANOI'S NATIONAL DAY LAST WEEK POINTS UP CONTINUING FRICTIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS CHINA'S CONCERN THAT HANOI IS FALLING UNDER MOSCOW'S DOMINATION. 4

THE CELEBRATIONS IN HANOI, MARKING THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT'S FOUNDING, CALLED FOR HIGH-LEVEL CHINESE ATTENTION, BUT PEKING APPEARS TO HAVE PLAYED DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EVENT AS WELL AS THE CURRENT STATUS OF CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM. 4

NEITHER THE MESSAGE FROM CHINESE LEADERS, INCLUDING MAO TSE-TUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI, NOR THE PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL MARKING THE OCCASION INCLUDED THE ENTHUSIASTIC EXPRESSIONS OF SINO-VIETNAMESE SOLIDARITY THAT WERE FEATURES OF CHINA'S STATEMENTS IN THE PAST. 4

// ALTHOUGH CHINA SENT A FAIRLY HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION TO HANOI LED BY POLITBURO MEMBER CHEN HSI-LIEN, PEKING DISPLAYED A CLEAR LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE ANNIVERSARY. // IN A SPEECH DELIVERED AT A VIETNAMESE IRON AND STEEL COMPLEX, CHEN DID REFER TO CHINA'S

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"INTERNATIONALIST OBLIGATION" TO SUPPORT THE VIETNAMESE, WHOM HE REFERRED TO AS "CLOSE COMRADES IN ARMS AND BROTHERS," BUT HE ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO LECTURE THE VIETNAMESE ON THE DANGERS OF SOVIET MACHINATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ELSEWHERE. 4

//THE CHINESE

OBVIOUSLY PLAN, WHEREVER POSSIBLE, TO ATTEMPT TO INCREASE THEIR OWN LEVERAGE WITH THE VIETNAMESE AND TO CONTINUE TO DRAW HANOI'S ATTENTION TO THE DARKER SIDE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. B//4

//HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE PEKING ACTUALLY HAS IN ITS ABILITY TO IMPROVE TIES WITH HANOI, TO SAY NOTHING OF EFFECTIVELY COUNTERING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN VIETNAM, IS ANOTHER QUESTION.

XXXXXXXXXX//DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA HAVE BEEN MANIFEST FOR SOME TIME—ESPECIALLY SINCE PEKING ASSUMED FULL CONTROL OF THE PARACEL ISLANDS LAST YEAR.

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THE CHINESE HAVE PORTRAYED THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE VIETNAMESE AS RESULTING FROM SOVIET "MEDDLING," PROBABLY TO DISGUISE THE SERIOUSNESS OF PEKING'S DIFFICULTIES WITH HANOI AND TO PREVENT RELATIONS FROM GETTING ANY WORSE. OVER THE LONG RUN, HOWEVER, THE CHINESE VIEW OF HANOI AS A SOVIET-BACKED CHALLENGER TO PEKING'S 25X1 OWN INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COULD MEAN THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL DETERIORATE EVEN FURTHER.

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1. PORTUGAL: PRIME MINISTER - DESIGNATE AZEVEDO, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE POLITICAL PARTIES, HAS ANNOUNCED THAT A NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE NAMED IN TWO OR THREE DAYS. THE ANTI-COMMUNIST FACTION OF MAJOR MELO ANTUNES, MEANWHILE, HAS TAKEN STEPS TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION WITHIN PORTUGAL'S RULING MILITARY COUNCILS.<sup>4</sup>

THE ANTUNES GROUP, EXCLUDED FROM RECENT MEETINGS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, QUICKLY MADE ITS PRESENCE FELT WHEN A REVAMPED COUNCIL MET FOR THE FIRST TIME YESTERDAY. THE COUNCIL DECIDED:

--TO APPOINT ANTUNES SUPPORTER VASCO LOURENCO HEAD OF A COMMITTEE TO RESTRUCTURE BOTH THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED ARMED FORCES GENERAL ASSEMBLY.<sup>5</sup>

--TO REINSTATE ANTI-COMMUNIST FORMER COUNCIL MEMBERS MELO ANTUNES AND VITOR ALVES.

--TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT MILITARY UNITS AND THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS.

--TO PROSCRIBE INTERVIEWS BY MILITARY FIGURES OTHER THAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO PREVENT PUBLIC

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STATEMENTS BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES AND OTHER  
PRO-COMMUNIST OFFICERS.4

WITH THE ANNOUNCED RESTRUCTURING OF THE ASSEMBLY, THE COUNCIL, WHICH SINCE JULY HAS BEEN RELEGATED TO A PURELY ADVISORY ROLE, APPEARED TO BE REASSERTING ITSELF AS THE SUPREME AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRY. AS EVIDENCE OF ITS NEW AUTHORITY, THE COUNCIL DECREED THAT DISCIPLINARY MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST A MILITARY POLICE REGIMENT THAT HAS REFUSED TO GO TO ANGOLA.4

THE COUNCIL ALSO CONFIRMED THE MILITARY'S INTENTION TO PLAY A DOMINANT POLITICAL ROLE WHEN IT LAUNCHED AN INVESTIGATION INTO STATEMENTS MADE BY A LOCAL LEADER OF THE CENTER-LEFT POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PARTY. THE PARTY OFFICIAL HAD URGED THAT THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT BE DISSOLVED, THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL BE SCRAPPED, AND THAT THE MILITARY RETURN TO ITS BARRACKS AND LEAVE THE RUNNING OF THE COUNTRY TO CIVILIAN POLITICIANS.4

IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, THE ANTUNES GROUP'S NEW ASSERTIVENESS WILL HAVE ON THE FORMATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. DURING THE STRUGGLE TO REMOVE GONCALVES, THE ANTUNES FACTION

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REPORTEDLY PURSUED A JOINT STRATEGY WITH THE SOCIALISTS AND POPULAR DEMOCRATS. THE GOODWILL ESTABLISHED DURING THAT PERIOD COULD EASILY BREAK DOWN, HOWEVER, IF THE POLITICAL PARTIES' EXCESSIVE DEMANDS FOR POWER FRUSTRATE THE MILITARY IN ITS DESIRE TO FORM A GOVERNMENT AND GET THE COUNTRY MOVING AGAIN. 4

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[redacted] BOTH THE DEMOCRATIC 25X1

PARTIES AND THE COMMUNISTS COULD CAUSE TROUBLE IN THE SELECTION OF A GOVERNMENT.

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2. USSR-US: TWO PROMINENT MEMBERS OF MOSCOW'S INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA HAVE IN RECENT ARTICLES DEFENDED SOVIET DETENTE POLICY AGAINST WESTERN CRITICS, AND PERHAPS AGAINST DOMESTIC SKEPTIC AS WELL. 4

THE ARTICLES SEEM TO BE FRESH EVIDENCE OF MOSCOW'S CONCERN OVER WHAT IT REGARDS AS RENEWED ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENT IN THE WEST, PARTICULARLY IN THE US. BOTH ARTICLES BETRAY A CERTAIN DEFENSIVENESS

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ABOUT THE FUTURE OF DETENTE--IN ONE CASE BY A BLUSTERY TONE, IN THE OTHER BY AN APPARENTLY FORCED EFFORT TO REASSURE THAT ALL WILL BE WELL IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR.4

IZVESTIA ■ ON SEPTEMBER 4 PUBLISHED A LENGTHY ARTICLE BY GEORGY ARBATOV, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE AND MOSCOW'S LEADING ACADEMIC AUTHORITY ON THE US. EVIDENTLY RESPONDING TO WESTERN DENIGRATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AGREEMENT, ARBATOV DEFENDS THE USSR AGAINST CHARGES OF NONCOMPLIANCE, ESPECIALLY WITH THE HUMAN CONTACTS PROVISIONS OF "BASKET THREE," BY LAUNCHING A SHARP COUNTERATTACK AIMED AT DISCREDITING THE WEST'S RIGHT TO PASS JUDGMENT ON THE SOVIET UNION. ARBATOV'S TOUGH LINE MAY BE INTENDED TO SET THE STAGE FOR FUTURE REBUFFS OF WESTERN EFFORTS TO "INTERFERE" IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE MAY ALSO WANT TO ASSURE HIS INTERNAL AUDIENCE THAT MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN PROMOTING DETENTE WILL NOT LEAD TO AN EASING OF ITS TIGHT CONTROL OVER DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.4

IN A CLEAR MESSAGE TO THE WEST, ARBATOV DENIES THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING TO USE DETENTE TO "NUDGE FORWARD" CLASS

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AND NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLES. HE DENIES THAT THE DIFFICULTIES FACING THE US IN GREECE, TURKEY, AND PORTUGAL ARE A CONSEQUENCE OF SOVIET ACTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE EXPRESSLY REJECTS ANY INTERPRETATION OF DETENTE AS ENTAILING A SOVIET OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE THE "SOCIAL STATUS QUO." IN ESSENCE, ARBATOV ARGUES THAT THE USSR HAS EVERY RIGHT UNDER DETENTE TO SUPPORT ITS FRIENDS.<sup>4</sup>

ARBATOV ALSO SEEMS TO BE REASSURING HIS DOMESTIC READERS THAT SUPPORT FOR DETENTE REMAINS STRONG IN THE US. HE IMPLICITLY CAUTIONS HIS SOVIET READERS NOT TO OVERESTIMATE THE STRENGTH OF DETENTE'S OPPONENTS AND NOT TO TURN AWAY FROM A POLICY THAT HAS BROUGHT THE USSR "STRIKING" ACHIEVEMENTS.<sup>4</sup>

THE MESSAGE THAT US-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE STILL GENERALLY HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION IS ALSO CONVEYED IN AN ARTICLE APPEARING IN THE SEPTEMBER ISSUE OF THE SOVIET JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WRITTEN BY GENRIKH TROFIMENKO, A SENIOR STAFF MEMBER OF ARBATOV'S INSTITUTE, THE ARTICLE CONTENDS THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE ATTAINED A "CERTAIN STABILITY"

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THAT CAN SUSTAIN TENSION-PRODUCING SHOCKS. HE CITES THE 1973  
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND 1974 US TRADE LEGISLATION AS SOURCES OF  
TENSION WHOSE EFFECTS HAVE BEEN FULLY OVERCOME. 4

TROFIMENKO ARGUES THAT THE COMPLEX OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS  
SINCE 1972 HAS CREATED A STABILIZING BASIS FOR RELATIONS WHICH,  
IF NOT UNSHAKABLE, HAS AT LEAST PERMITTED THE TWO SIDES TO  
WEATHER SUBSEQUENT PROBLEMS WITHOUT A DAMAGING "RIPPLE"  
EFFECT. 4

TROFIMENKO ADDS TO THIS ROSY ASSESSMENT THE VIEW THAT  
ENEMIES OF DETENTE IN THE US WILL BE OVERCOME. IN SUPPORT OF  
THIS ASSERTION HE CLAIMS THAT EVEN THE US "ESTABLISHMENT" NOW  
SUPPORTS DETENTE WITH THE USSR. HE PROFESSES CONFIDENCE THAT  
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WILL BE NORMALIZED AND THAT FURTHER PROGRESS  
WILL BE MADE ON LIMITING STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

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3. USSR: THE SOVIET REGIME HAS REVERSED ITSELF AND IS  
GRANTING PERMISSION FOR MOSCOW'S UNCONVENTIONAL ARTISTS TO HOLD  
A TEN-DAY INDOOR EXHIBIT OF THEIR WORKS STARTING SEPTEMBER 20. 4

ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY, BOTH THE ORGINAL DECISION IN

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LATE AUGUST TO BAN THE EXHIBIT AND THE REVERSAL A WEEK LATER WERE MADE AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE LEVEL. A SIMILAR BUT SMALLER SCALE SHOW OF UNORTHODOX ART IS REPORTEDLY SCHEDULED TO OPEN IN LENINGRAD TOMORROW. 4

THE REGIME MAY HAVE ACTED TO AVOID UNFAVORABLE WESTERN PUBLICITY ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY-SEPTEMBER 15-OF THE "ART MASSACRE" IN MOSCOW. PLANS WERE ALREADY AFOOT AMONG THE UNCONVENTIONAL ARTISTS TO MARK THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE REGIME'S USE OF BULLDOZERS AND WATER CANNON TO DISRUPT AN OPEN-AIR ART SHOW. THE ARTISTS' DETERMINATION TO ACT REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES MAY HAVE CONVINCED THE AUTHORITIES THAT A COMPROMISE THIS YEAR IS THE BEST WAY TO MINIMIZE PUBLICITY. 4

THE ARTISTS SAY THEY ARE VERY SATISFIED WITH THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS, WHICH PROVIDE FOR SHOWING SOME 3,000 PAINTINGS BY ALMOST 200 EXHIBITORS IN A LARGE, TWO-STORY HALL. NO PRIOR CENSORSHIP OF THE WORKS HAS BEEN IMPOSED, SAVE FOR A BAN ON "ANTI-SOVIET" AND "PORNOGRAPHIC" ART. 4

THE REGIME, HOWEVER, DID SCORE POINTS IN SCHEDULING THE EXHIBIT

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TO OPEN AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 15 ANNIVERSARY AND IN LIMITING EXHIBITORS TO THOSE LEGALLY RESIDENT IN MOSCOW. SIMILARLY, THE LENINGRAD SHOW IS LIMITED TO ARTISTS RESIDENT IN THAT CITY. THERE ARE PRESS REPORTS THAT A SPLINTER GROUP OF ARTISTS IN MOSCOW IS UNHAPPY WITH THESE STIPULATIONS AND THAT SOME OF THEM ARE PLANNING AN UNAUTHORIZED "GESTURE" IN THE CAPITAL EITHER ON SEPTEMBER 15 OR DURING THE LATER EXHIBIT.4

BY LIMITING THE SHOWS IN MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD TO LOCAL ARTISTS, THE REGIME AVOIDS DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE. LOCAL CULTURAL AFFAIRS COME UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES. MINISTER OF CULTURE AND CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER PETR DEMICHEV CAN THUS DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SHOWS' SUCCESS OR FAILURE.4

THE SITUATION FACED BY THE ARTISTS MIRRORS IN MANY WAYS THAT OF THE DISSIDENTS, JEWS, AND OTHERS REGARDED BY THE REGIME AS BEING ON THE DANGEROUS FRINGE OF SOVIET SOCIETY. MANY OF THEM INITIALLY HAD HOPED THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE WOULD RESULT IN AN EASING OF DOMESTIC CONDITIONS EVEN WHILE SOVIET PROPAGANDA WAS DOING ITS UTMOST TO DISABUSE THEM OF THEIR HOPES.4

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THE REGIME'S SEE-SAW ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ARTISTS ILLUSTRATES THE CONTINUING INERTIA IN SOVIET CULTURAL POLICY AND THE RESULTING DISARRAY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. ON A WIDER SCALE, THIS ATTITUDE HAS PRODUCED A PATTERN OF RELUCTANT CONCESSIONS TO THOSE FEW ABLE TO ENLIST WESTERN PUBLICITY, WHILE THE MANY WITHOUT A VOICE MUST ENDURE A CONTINUING CAMPAIGN AGAINST UNORTHODOXY. 4

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE COMING MONTHS MAY WITNESS SOME UPSURGE IN DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES. SUCH ACTIVITY COULD SPARK CONFLICT AS DISSIDENTS SEEK NEW WAYS TO TURN THE SPOTLIGHT OF BOTH WESTERN PUBLICITY AND OFFICIAL PRESSURE ONTO THE SOVIET DOMESTIC SCENE.

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